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An investigation of the role of group-based shame and guilt in motivating citizens of ex-colonial countries to support restitution to former colonized 
groups which were the target of violence and oppression. Study 1 (N = 125) was conducted in Australia during the lead-up to the first official government 
apology to Aboriginal Australians. Among white Australians, guilt and shame were associated with attitudinal support for intergroup apology and victim 
compensation. However, only shame was associated with actual political behaviour (signing a petition in support of the apology). Study 2 (N = 181), 
conducted in Britain, focussed on Britain’s violent mistreatment of the Kenyan population during decolonization. It tested a hypothesis that there are 
two forms of shame—essence shame and image shame—and demonstrated that image shame was associated with support for apology, whereas essence 
shame was associated with support for more substantial material and financial compensation. The findings are discussed in light of promoting restitution 
and reconciliation within nations with histories of colonial violence.
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1. Colonization and a New International Morality
The process of colonization was generally associated with 
systems of violence and discrimination against indigenous 
peoples around the world. In many instances the coloniz-
ing country robbed the colonized groups of land, resources, 
culture, and dignity. In the worst instances indigenous peo-
ples were forcibly displaced or massacred. Regrettably, such 
legacies of colonization can be found throughout the world. 
European nations such as Portugal, France, Germany, 
Italy, Holland, and Belgium were quick to institute ruling 
systems around the globe that, by today’s standards, were 
often racist, violent, and exploitative (Ferro 1997; Mosse 
1985; Pakenham 1992). British colonial rule in particular led 
to profound disadvantage and suffering among indigenous 
groups, particularly in African, Pacific, and Asian regions 
(Porter 1984; James 1997; Ferguson 2004). We focus in detail 
on two examples, Kenya and Australia. 
Recently there has been a growing international recognition 
of the lasting effects of colonial violence and discrimina-
tion on the colonized, and an increasing willingness to 
address these issues (Barkan 2000; Nobles 2008; Thompson 
2002). In many countries, offers of apology and reparations 
from former colonizing groups have been forthcoming in 
recognition of unjust past policies and as a means to restore 
a more moral intergroup relationship (Nobles 2008). Such 
acts have the potential to promote reconciliation between 
groups (Barkan 2000). For example, Queen Elizabeth II and 
a number of New Zealand prime ministers have apologized 
to Indigenous Maori for violations of the 1840 Treaty of 
Waitangi; U.S. president Bill Clinton issued an apology to 
Hawaiians for violations of their sovereignty in 1893; and 
the Canadian government has apologized to the Indigenous 
Canadian population for extensive historical mistreatment 
(e.g., see Nobles 2008). 
The authors would like to thank Aarti Iyer for her 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this 
manuscript. The research and preparation of this 
paper was supported by a New Zealand Tertiary 
Education Commission Bright Future Top Achiever 
Doctoral Scholarship, awarded to the primary 
author. We would also like to thank Olivia Barlow, 
Rory Barlow, Phillippa Diedrichs, Anna Cooke, 
Mark Howarth, Daniel Stjepanovic, and Katie 
Greenaway for help with data collection for Study 1.
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Barkan (2000) suggests the rapid and widespread increase 
in restorative actions by powerful groups around the world 
points to a new moral awareness within the international 
community. Although there are a number of political, 
historical, economic, and social conditions that have led 
former colonizing groups to attempt to make amends with 
the colonized, the present paper focuses specifically on the 
psychological processes that motivate members of coloniz-
ing groups to support restitution for past wrongs and desire 
reconciliation with members of “victim” groups. Particu-
larly, we focus on a relatively new concept within social psy-
chology, group-based emotions, as motivators of collective 
moral action (Eliot R. Smith 1993). 
1.1. Shame and Guilt
Our specific focus is on the self-conscious emotions of 
group-based shame and guilt (Lewis 1971; Tangney and 
Fischer 1995). At the individual level, one of the most influ-
ential distinctions between the two emotions was provided 
by Lewis (1971). Lewis described both shame and guilt as 
negative self-focused emotions that arise from the violation 
of a moral or social code; she posited, however, that they dif-
fer in the degree to which the self is implicated in the behav-
iour. She proposed that guilt primarily results from a focus 
on how a person’s behaviour has negatively affected some-
one else, whereas shame results from a focus on how the 
behaviour reflects a globally flawed self. The distinction can 
be summarized thus: guilt arises because one has behaved 
badly, whereas shame arises because one is a bad person.
Given the theoretical differences between shame and guilt, 
one would expect the emotions to be associated with differ-
ent motivational and behavioural outcomes. Because guilt 
derives from a focus on an act of negative behaviour that is 
specific and controllable, it is believed to be associated with 
attempts at restitution (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heather-
ton 1994). On the other hand, because shame is associated 
with a perception of the self as flawed, it is typically more 
aversive and debilitating than guilt and is thought to be 
associated with withdrawal and hiding (Tangney, Miller, 
Flicker, and Barlow 1996; Wicker, Payne, and Morgan 1983). 
These predictions have received some empirical support at 
both the individual (e.g., Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavan-
ski 1994; Tangney, 1991) and group levels (e.g., Iyer, Schmad-
er, and Lickel 2007; Johns, Schmader, and Lickel 2005), 
although, as the present paper will demonstrate, there is 
growing evidence that shame at the group level can also be 
associated with pro-social outcomes.
Research at an interpersonal level identifies guilt as fulfill-
ing an important social function by both preventing future 
transgressions and motivating efforts to make amends after 
their occurrence (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heather-
ton 1994; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, and 
Gramzow 1996). Shame has been linked with feelings of 
worthlessness, powerlessness, and anger, and research at the 
interpersonal level suggests that it is associated with victim-
directed antagonism and a desire to withdraw from and 
avoid the situation in question (Rodogno 2008; Roseman, 
Wiest, and Swartz 1994; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, and 
Gramzow 1992). We can thus see that both shame and guilt 
have influential effects on interpersonal interaction. 
1.2. Group-based Emotions
Group-based emotions are emotions that are experienced 
when group membership, and therefore social identity is 
salient (Eliot R. Smith 1993). These emotions, which may be 
either positive (e.g., pride) or negative (e.g., shame), can act 
as important motivators of intergroup behaviour. Our focus 
is on group-based guilt and shame, which differ in two im-
portant ways from individual-level guilt and shame. Firstly, 
they can arise in response to moral violations by members 
of a group to which one belongs, even if those experiencing 
the emotions were not directly implicated, or may not even 
have been alive at the time (Eliot R. Smith 1993). Secondly, 
the experience of these emotions can motivate behaviour 
toward members of the “victim” outgroup, even if these 
members were not personally victims of the original mal-
treatment.
Several studies have investigated the effects of guilt at the 
group level. Two studies that specifically investigated group-
based guilt in relation to colonial injustices were conducted 
by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) and 
McGarty et al. (2005). In the first, Doosje and colleagues 
(1998) found that feelings of “collective” guilt among Dutch 
students predicted their willingness to advocate both 
personal and governmental compensation to Indonesians 
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for past colonial injustices perpetrated by their group. 
Similarly, McGarty and colleagues (2005) demonstrated 
that although group-based guilt tended to be low among 
non-Indigenous Australians, it was strongly associated with 
support for an official apology to Aboriginal Australians for 
discriminatory practices occurring in both the nineteenth 
(Study 2) and twentieth centuries (Study 1). A number of 
other studies demonstrate the positive associations between 
guilt and support for reparation in various intergroup 
conflicts. Examples include non-Indigenous Chileans’ 
treatment of Indigenous Chileans (Brown et al. 2008), 
intergroup relations in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina 
(Brown and Cehajic 2008), illegitimate (majority) ingroup 
advantage in the United States and Europe (Iyer, Leach, 
and Crosby 2003; Mallett and Swim 2007; Swim and Miller 
1999; Harth, Kessler, and Leach 2008; Harvey and Oswald 
2000; Leach, Iyer, and Pederson 2006; Miron, Branscombe, 
and Schmitt 2006), and national involvement in war (All-
press and Brown forthcoming; Iyer et al. 2007). 
Despite the evidence demonstrating positive associations 
between guilt and support for reparation, recent research 
suggests that the pro-social effects of guilt may be limited 
only to abstract support for restitution. For instance, with 
regard to Aboriginal Australians’ disadvantage within 
Australian society, Leach and colleagues (2006) showed 
that non-Indigenous Australians’ guilt predicted attitudinal 
support for compensation, but did not predict intentions 
to act on these attitudes after accounting for respondents’ 
prejudice and anger. Similarly, Iyer and colleagues (2007) 
found that feelings of guilt amongst American and British 
students over the invasion of Iraq did not predict support 
for any reparative actions after accounting for feelings of 
shame and anger. In the present paper we build upon the 
above studies by proposing that the predictive power of 
shame may render collective guilt less important a predic-
tor of actual collective action. In Study 1 we evaluate this 
proposal in relation to a marker of actual political activ-
ism: signing a political petition advocating apology toward 
Aboriginal Australians.
There is less research into shame at the group level, and 
no research that we know of has investigated group-based 
shame specifically in relation to historical cases of colonial 
violence. Furthermore, the findings of the extant studies are 
somewhat inconsistent. In line with research on interper-
sonal shame, a small number of studies have found an as-
sociation between shame and distancing motivations (Iyer 
et al. 2007; Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2006; Schmader 
and Lickel 2006). For example, Lickel and colleagues (2005) 
found that feelings of shame elicited by the wrongdoings of 
others were associated with a desire to distance oneself from 
both the situation and those responsible for the wrongdo-
ing. Similarly, Johns, Schmader, and Lickel (2005) dem-
onstrated that U.S. citizens’ feelings of shame in response 
to prejudice exhibited against people of Middle Eastern 
descent in the aftermath of 9/11 was associated with a desire 
to distance oneself from the ingroup perpetrators of the 
discrimination and, in some instances, a desire to distance 
oneself from the ingroup in general. 
Not all research investigating group-based shame has 
been consistent with the above studies, however. Other 
work has found an association between shame and various 
pro-social attitudes. For example, Brown and colleagues 
(2008) conducted three studies in Chile investigating non-
Indigenous Chileans’ feelings of shame about the treatment 
of the country’s largest indigenous group, the Mapuche. 
They found that shame had cross-sectional associations 
with attitudinal support for reparations to the Mapuche 
(a composite measure consisting of support for: apology, 
compensation, outgroup economic benefits, and a tolerant 
society) and that this association was mediated by a desire 
to improve the reputation of non-Indigenous Chileans. In 
a similar manner, Brown and Cehajic (2008) found that 
Bosnian Serbs’ feelings of shame about their group’s actions 
during the 1992–95 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina predicted 
attitudinal support for reparations to Bosnian Muslims 
(consisting of apology, compensation, and a desire to assist 
the outgroup).
1.3. Present Research
As we can see, although a number of studies have inves-
tigated the effect of guilt and shame in group contexts, a 
number of questions remain unaddressed. The present 
paper focuses on two distinct questions. The first relates 
to whether shame and guilt predict an instance of actual 
political behaviour—petition-signing (Study 1; conducted 
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in the context of the mistreatment of Aboriginal Austra-
lians). The second question is whether shame is related to 
pro-social outcomes (Study 1), and if such an association is 
observed, what might account for the association between 
shame and anti-social outcomes in some studies and pro-
social outcomes in others (Study 2; conducted in the context 
of Kenyan decolonization). The paper therefore provides a 
novel contribution to the literature in two respects. 
2. Study 1: Shame and Action in Australia 
2.1. Historical and Political Context
The colonial treatment of Aboriginal Australians was both 
violent and discriminatory. In the twentieth century, the 
policy of removal of Aboriginal children from their families 
and placement into white homes or state care—the “Stolen 
Generations”—became a focus of activism and advocacy. 
We focus on this issue not only because it caused consider-
able damage to Aboriginal individuals, families, and com-
munities, but because our research was conducted in the 
days prior to the first official national apology to the Stolen 
Generations by the federal government. 
Aboriginal children in Australia were taken from their 
families from the very first days of colonization. The Hu-
man Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (1997) 
estimates that “between one in three and one in ten Indig-
enous children were forcibly removed from their families 
and communities between 1910 and 1970”, and that conse-
quently all Indigenous families were affected in one or more 
generation in the last century. The removal of children in 
the twentieth century was a dramatic manifestation of the 
government’s policy of assimilation and the institutional-
ized racism within Australia. The practice caused extensive 
trauma to Indigenous families and a loss of identity and 
culture (Pilger 1989).
The consequences for Aboriginal Australians of two 
centuries of deprivation are powerfully represented in the 
group’s statistics. Compared to non-Indigenous Austra-
lians, Aboriginal Australians’ life expectancy is approxi-
mately eighteen years lower; the rate of infant mortality is 
three times higher; rates of both chronic and communicable 
diseases are between two and ten times higher; the rate 
of self-harm and suicide is approximately twice as high; 
incarceration rates are fifteen times higher; unemployment 
is three times higher; two thirds of the Aboriginal popula-
tion are without post-secondary education, and Indigenous 
people are between six and nineteen times more likely to 
live in overcrowded housing (Human Rights and Equal Op-
portunities Commission 2006).
The purpose of Study 1 was to evaluate the relationship 
between white Australians’ feelings of group-based shame 
and guilt and their support for actions designed to repair 
this historical damage. We hypothesized that both guilt 
and shame would positively predict attitudinal support 
for apology and compensation. Additionally, in light of re-
search demonstrating the weak or non-existent relationship 
between guilt and action intentions (e.g., Leach et al. 2006; 
Iyer et al. 2007), we hypothesized that shame, but not guilt, 
would predict political behaviour (petition signing).
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants
A sample of 136 participants was recruited during lunch 
hours in a shopping mall food-court in central Brisbane, 
Australia. Of those recruited, 125 (47 male, 78 female) 
participants who self-identified as “European/white Aus-
tralian” were included in the final analysis. The ages in the 
sample ranged from 15 to 72, with a mean of 32 years of 
age. 
2.2.2. Procedure
Questionnaire data were collected on February 11, 2008, two 
days prior to the incoming Labor government’s scheduled 
apology to the Stolen Generations. The event was highly 
publicized and there was significant public discussion 
around the issue at the time. This is reflected in the present 
sample, in which 93 percent of respondents were aware of 
the forthcoming apology. Thus, the intergroup apology was 
a highly salient and relevant topic for participants.
Participants were approached while they were sitting, often 
while they were eating lunch. They were told of the nature 
of the questionnaire, that it was being run in connection 
with the University of Queensland, and asked if they would 
like to share their views. Upon completing the question-
naire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their in-
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volvement in the research. A small chocolate compensation 
was offered to each participant as a “thank you” for helping 
with the research.
2.2.3. Measures
All items were measured on nine-point scales. To accom-
modate the busy sample population, all scales consisted of 
just one or two items.
Shame was measured using two items: “Due to the long 
history of discrimination against Aboriginal Australians, 
I feel ashamed” and “I feel shame when I think about how 
non-Indigenous Australians have behaved towards Aborigi-
nal Australians”, r = .76, p < .001.
Guilt was measured using two items: “I feel guilty about the 
negative things non-Indigenous Australians have done to 
Aboriginal Australians in the past” and “I feel guilty about 
the present social inequality between Aboriginal and non-
Indigenous Australians”, r = .76, p < .001.1
Support for apology was measured using two items: “I am 
supportive of the government’s apology to the Stolen Gen-
erations” and “I agree with the government’s apology to the 
Stolen Generations”, r = .96, p < .001.
Support for compensation was measured with a single item: 
“Monetary compensation to the Stolen Generation is a good 
idea”.
Petition signing. Participants were also given the opportu-
nity to sign what they believed to be a real petition to be 
sent to their local member of parliament, indicating their 
support for the upcoming apology. The reported score 
reflects whether participants actually signed the petition (1) 
or not (0).
2.3. Results
The means of, and correlations among the five key vari-
ables are presented in Table 1. As can be seen in the table, 
the levels of shame, guilt, and support for the apology were 
moderate, with support for financial compensation some-
what lower. To test the effect of our two predictors, shame 
and guilt, three regression analyses were conducted to pre-
dict apology support, compensation support, and petition 
signing.
Table 1: Means of and inter-correlations among variables, Study 1
M SD 2 3 4 5
1. Shame 4.94 2.56 .79** .60** .56** .60**
2. Guilt 4.64 2.65 .61** .54** .56**
3. Apology support 6.35 2.75 .57** .65**
4. Compensation support 3.85 2.71 .48**
5. Petition signing .47 .50
** Correlation is significant at the .001 level
2.3.1. Distinguishing Guilt and Shame
A high correlation was observed between shame and guilt 
(see Table 1), and therefore a confirmatory factor analysis 
was conducted to determine whether the separation of these 
two variables was warranted. A model in which guilt and 
shame items were specified as loading on separate factors 
was tested first. The factors were allowed to correlate and no 
observed items were allowed to cross-load. All items loaded 
significantly onto their predicted factors (all loadings > .81), 
and the model fitted the data well, χ² (1) = .39, p = .53, NFI = 
.999, RMSEA < .001. Consistent with the theoretical 
distinction between the two constructs, a model in which 
both shame and guilt items were specified as loading onto 
a single factor provided a significantly worse fit to the data, 
∆χ² (1) = 8.38, p < .05.
2.3.2. Regression Analyses
Support for apology. The model containing shame and guilt 
explained 40 percent of the variance in support for apology, 
R2 = .40, F(2,122) = 42.65, p < .001. Both shame 
(β = .33, p < .005) and guilt (β = .35, p < .005) were significant 
positive predictors of support for the apology.
1 Given that the second guilt item refers specifically 
to present inequality, analyses were also conducted 
with this item omitted. This analysis did not 
differ meaningfully from the analysis presented 
below, indicating that the focus of this item did 
not specifically influence the reported results.
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Support for compensation. As with support for apology, the 
model explained a significant proportion of the variance in 
support for compensation, R2 = .33, F(2,120) = 30.86, p < .001. 
Again, both shame (β = .36, p < .005) and guilt (β = .25, 
p < .05) significantly predicted support for compensation.
Petition signing. A logistic regression analysis was conduct-
ed to predict, from feelings of shame and guilt, the likeli-
hood of signing a petition to be sent to parliament pledging 
support for the upcoming apology. The model accounted for 
31 percent of the variance in petition signing, Nagelkerke R² 
= .31, χ² (2) = 32.08, p < .001. Inspection of the coefficients 
revealed that shame was significantly linked to petition 
signing, Exp(B) = 1.44, Wald = 7.37, p < .01. This finding 
means that the odds of signing the petition were 1.44 times 
higher for each one-point increase in reported shame. Guilt 
was not significantly linked to an increased likelihood of 
petition signing, Exp(B) = 1.16, Wald = 1.56, p < .22. 
2.4. Discussion
The present study indicates that both shame and guilt were 
associated with pro-social attitudes toward apology and 
compensation. When taken into account simultaneously, 
only shame predicted behavioural action (petition signing) 
in support for the forthcoming apology. The findings in 
relation to guilt are consistent with past research demon-
strating that although group-based guilt is associated with 
abstract attitudinal support for restitution (e.g., Doosje et al. 
1998; McGarty et al. 2005), its positive effects may not trans-
late into behavioural intentions (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et 
al., 2006). The present study extends this work by evaluating 
actual behavioural support for group-based apology. It is 
important to reiterate that both attitudinal support for apol-
ogy and behavioural support for apology action reflected 
the degree to which participants supported their ingroup’s 
apology. The key difference between the two measures was 
that the petition measure reflected a concrete behavioural 
action in support of the apology, whereas the attitudinal 
measure reflected abstract support for the apology.
One methodological concern arises from the high inter-
correlation between guilt and shame: namely, that response 
bias present in the items may have blurred the distinc-
tion between the two variables. The support provided by 
confirmatory factor analyses for the theoretical distinction 
between the variables, as well as the differential predictive 
power of shame and guilt for the behavioural measure, peti-
tion signing, suggest that such bias is unlikely to account for 
the present findings, however. Methodological constraints 
notwithstanding, the finding that shame is predictive of 
positive attitudes toward apology, compensation, and politi-
cal behaviour is inconsistent with some previous theorizing 
and research on shame (Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2005; 
Rodogno 2008; Schmader and Lickel 2006; Tangney et al. 
1992). Study 2 investigates a possible explanation for the 
inconsistency between the present findings and previous 
literature: that there are two different forms of shame with 
different effects: “essence shame” and “image shame”.
3. “Essence Shame” and “Image Shame”
Study 1 provided further evidence that shame can have 
pro-social correlates. Although our data are inconsistent 
with some previous work (Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 
2005; Rodogno 2008; Schmader and Lickel 2006; Tangney 
et al. 1992), two recent studies support our findings. The first 
showed that shame predicted not only British participants’ 
desire to apologize and provide compensation to those 
harmed during the recent war in Iraq, but also a desire for 
future contact with Iraqis (Allpress and Brown 2010). The 
second, conducted in Norway and focussing on the histori-
cal mistreatment of the Norwegian Gypsies (called Tatere), 
reaffirmed the pro-social associations of shame by provid-
ing evidence that shame predicts pro-sociality (empathy, 
restitution, desire for contact) when controlling for feelings 
of rejection (which predict self-defensive responses) and 
inferiority (Gausel et al. forthcoming). There is mounting 
evidence, therefore, that shame may be associated with pro-
social outcomes. However, it remains unclear why shame is 
associated with avoidance in some instances and support 
for restitution in others. 
We propose that there are two primary types or forms of 
shame, and that the differences between these two forms 
can explain the inconsistencies within the shame literature. 
Although group-based shame has widely been regarded as 
arising from a global negative evaluation of the ingroup, 
it is unclear whether this negative evaluation refers to an 
internalized perception that the ingroup has a negative es-
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sence, or from the perception that others see the ingroup in 
a negative manner, that its image is tainted in some way.
The “image” component of shame, which has been widely 
emphasized as a crucial aspect (e.g., Scheff 2000; Richard. 
H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre 2002), is captured by 
Branscombe, Slugoski and Kappen’s remark that “collective 
shame involves being publicly exposed as incompetent, not 
being in control, weak and potentially even disgusting in 
the eyes of others” (2004, 29, emphasis in original). A subtly 
different emphasis can be found in the suggestion by Lickel, 
Schmader and Barquissau (2004) that shame is associated 
with a perception that the ingroup has a negative “essence”: 
“collective shame stems from perceiving that the actions of 
the ingroup confirm or reveal a flawed aspect of one’s social 
identity” and “implicate something about the very nature 
of who they are” (2004, 42–43). We treat these two differ-
ent descriptions as reflecting two different forms of shame, 
with different associated outcomes, rather than simply an 
argument over the definition of shame. One form—which 
we term image shame—arises from the perception that the 
ingroup is perceived negatively in the eyes of others, while 
the other—which we term essence shame—arises from an 
internalized perception that the ingroup has some inher-
ently negative quality.2
We believe “essence shame” arises when deeds done in the 
name of the ingroup are perceived by the ingroup member 
to have violated an important moral standard and when the 
individual recognizes the effects of the ingroup’s deeds on 
the “victims”. Furthermore, we propose that essence shame 
arises when individuals believe, or fear, that their group’s 
actions reflect some underlying negative aspect or char-
acteristic of the ingroup. We predict that, because essence 
shame is associated with an internalized belief that the 
ingroup’s behaviour reflects something negative about the 
group’s essence, individuals will cope with their feelings of 
shame in three different ways. The first is to sub-categorize 
those members of the ingroup who are perceived to have 
perpetrated the misdeeds, thus distancing the ingroup from 
those who committed the wrongdoing; the second is to dis-
identify with the ingroup, thus distancing oneself from the 
ingroup (both strategies have been proposed by Lickel et al. 
2004 and Lickel et al. 2005); the third, and most important 
for the present study, is to attempt to restore the ingroup’s 
moral standing by behaving in a pro-social manner.
We view “image shame” as being based on a perception that 
the ingroup’s standing, image, and reputation within the 
wider community are threatened. Because image shame 
is associated with an external criticism of the ingroup, we 
predict that there will be four ways individuals may cope. 
As with essence shame, participants may sub-categorize 
the perpetrators or disidentify with the ingroup (Lickel et 
al. 2004; Lickel et al. 2005). Differently from essence shame, 
however, group members may avoid the issue or withdraw 
from the situation—a strategy often seen as a typical shame 
reaction. Finally, and somewhat counter-intuitively, group 
members may also support limited acts of restitution if 
they believe this support is likely to improve the ingroup’s 
reputation and image in the eyes of third parties. Indeed, 
as noted earlier, Brown and colleagues (2008) found such a 
relationship, where a positive association between (undif-
ferentiated) shame and support for restitution was mediated 
by reputation concerns. We address some of these predic-
tions empirically in Study 2.
4. Study 2: Essence and Image Shame about Kenya 
4.1. Historical and Political Context
Britain maintained colonial rule over Kenya from the 1880s 
through to 1963, as part of a larger African empire. Space 
constraints preclude a full description of the long history of 
Kenyan resistance, but several general histories may be of 
interest to readers (Ferguson 2004; James 1997; Pakenham 
1992). Below we describe the lead-up to Kenyan indepen-
dence, a bloody struggle known as the Mau Mau revolution.
2 This distinction is related but not identical to the 
analysis of shame by Gausel et al. (2009). In their 
account, there is a single emotion of shame which 
derives from an appraisal of the flawed moral 
character of the ingroup (similar to our concept 
of “essence shame”). This emotion is thought (and 
found) to have positive associations with various 
prosocial outcomes. In addition, there may be 
feelings of rejection or inferiority that stem from an 
appraisal that one’s group is rebuffed or dispar-
aged by others. These emotions are thought (and 
found) to be linked to negative social outcomes. 
At this stage, we have an open mind as to the 
relative merits of these different formulations, 
especially because their empirical basis is still 
nascent. For the present purposes, we prefer our 
simpler “essence” vs. “image” formulation until 
further research has decisively clarified the matter.
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The Mau Mau revolution grew largely out of social and 
economic pressure on the Kenyan Kikuyu population dur-
ing the 1940s and early 1950s (Anderson 2005; Berman 1976; 
Throup 1985). Mau Mau, Kenyans who took an oath against 
British colonial rule, typically members of the Kikuyu ethnic 
group, began destroying settler properties in the early 1950s, 
killing a small number of white settlers and assassinating 
a larger number of loyalists—Indigenous Kenyans, often 
Kikuyu, who “collaborated” with and profited from colonial 
rule. In 1952 the colonial government responded by declar-
ing a state of emergency and increasing military control over 
the country. The majority of the Kikuyu population was re-
located to detention camps and guarded villages (Anderson 
2005; Elkins 2005) while British forces attempted to detain 
or kill those Kenyans who had taken the Mau Mau oath.
The atmosphere in these camps, which has been likened to 
both the Soviet gulags and Nazi concentration camps, was 
one of ritualized dehumanization, forced labour, physi-
cal and psychological violence, torture, and death (Elkins 
2005). Elkins (2005) provides examples of the mistreatment 
of detainees, including regular beatings, forced sodomy 
among male prisoners, gang rape of female prisoners, beat-
ing of children, and sleep deprivation. Figures indicate that, 
in total, the Mau Mau killed thirty-two white settlers, over 
two thousand African civilians, and approximately two 
hundred British soldiers. The death toll for the Kikuyu was 
significantly higher, with between twelve thousand and one 
hundred thousand Kikuyu killed by British forces (Ander-
son 2005; Corfield 1960; Elkins 2005).
That is the background to Study 2. We hypothesized 
that after making ingroup wrongdoing salient to British 
participants, essence shame would be positively associated 
with support for both apology and (financial and material) 
compensation. We predicted that image shame would be 
positively associated with support for apology. However, 
because image shame arises primarily out of a concern for 
how the ingroup is viewed by third parties and not a desire 
to restore an equal intergroup relationship, this positive 
association was not predicted for support for compensa-
tion, which is also a potentially more costly political action. 
Rather, we reason that because compensation requires a 
tangible and often prolonged commitment to addressing 
the ingroup’s wrongdoing, individuals high in image shame 
will avoid this strategy, producing a negative association 
between image shame and concrete support for reparation.
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants
Participants were 183 first-year undergraduate psychol-
ogy students from a British university. The 161 participants 
who self-identified as “British” (25 males, 136 females) were 
included in the final analysis. Their ages ranged from 18 to 
55, with a mean of 20 years of age.
4.2.2. Procedure
Data were collected in early 2009. Students were informed 
that participation was entirely voluntary. The questionnaire 
contained a short article, written for the purposes of Study 2, 
on the response of the British government to the Mau Mau 
revolution between 1952 and 1960. The article was ostensibly 
sourced from the Guardian, a reputable British newspaper. It 
gave an account of the number of British and Kikuyu killed 
during the uprising and information about the often horrible 
conditions in the British-run detention camps. The article 
contained brief details of the beatings, starvation, and torture 
that occurred within the camps, and ended with a statement 
that there have been recent discussions about Britain’s need 
to apologize and offer reparations to those Kenyans affected 
during this period. The dependent measures then followed.
4.2.3. Measures
All items were measured on nine-point scales and were 
positively scored. 
Essence shame was measured using two items: “Our treat-
ment of Kenyan people makes me feel somewhat ashamed 
about what it means to be British” and “I feel ashamed to be 
British for the way we have treated the Kenyan people”, r = 
.80, p < .001.
Image shame was measured using two items: “I feel humili-
ated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the 
rest of the world for how it has treated the Kenyan people” 
and “I feel bad because the behaviour of British people 
towards the Kenyan people has created a bad image of us in 
the eyes of the world” r = .73, p < .001. 
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Guilt was measured using two items adapted from Brown et 
al. (2008): “Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for 
the behaviour of British people toward the Kenyans” and 
“I feel guilty for the manner in which Kenyans have been 
treated in the past by British”, r = .67, p < .001.
Support for apology was measured with one item: “The Brit-
ish government should issue an apology for the atrocities 
committed against the Kenyan people”.
Support for material and financial compensation was 
measured with two items: “I support the idea of the British 
government compensating Kenyans financially for past in-
justices” and “I agree with the idea of the British government 
making material reparations to Kenyans”, r = .83, p < .001.
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Distinguishing Image Shame, Essence Shame, and Guilt
As in Study 1, high inter-correlations were observed among 
the key independent variables (see Table 2). Confirmatory 
factor analyses were accordingly performed to assess the 
factor structure of the items measuring essence shame, 
image shame, and guilt. In the first model, the factors were 
allowed to correlate but no observed items were allowed 
to cross-load. As expected, the factors were inter-related 
(.66 < rs < .77), and all items loaded significantly onto their 
predicted factors (all loadings > .80). The model provided an 
acceptable fit to the data, χ² (6) = 10.08, p = .12, CFI = .993, 
RMSEA = .065. In addition, the hypothesized three-factor 
model proved superior to two alternative models. A model 
that specified the essence and image shame items as loading 
onto one “shame” factor, in addition to a guilt factor, pro-
vided a significant decrease in fit, ∆χ² (2) = 46.57, p < .001. 
A third model, in which all items loaded onto one omnibus 
“negative emotion” factor, also proved inferior, ∆χ² (3) = 
78.12, p < .001. Thus, the data support the contention that 
image shame, essence shame, and guilt are separate factors, 
consistent with our expectations.
Table 2: Means of and inter-correlations among variables, Study 2
M SD 2 3 4 5
1. Essence shame 5.85 2.10 .66** .62** .41** .39**
2. Image shame 5.35 1.97 .56** .45** .25**
3. Guilt 5.95 2.06 .46** .45**
4. Apology support 7.27 1.87 .53**
5. Compensation Support 5.98 1.89
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level
4.3.2. Regression Analyses
The means of, and correlations among the five key vari-
ables are presented in Table 2. To test the effect of essence 
shame, image shame, and guilt on support for restitution, 
two regression analyses were conducted in which apology 
support and compensation support were regressed onto the 
three predictors.
Support for apology. The model containing essence shame, 
image shame, and guilt explained 25 percent of the variance 
in support for apology, F(3,157) = 19.05, p < .001. Both guilt 
(β = .28, p < .005) and image shame (β = .24, p < .05) were 
significant positive predictors of support for an apology 
being offered to Kenyan people. Essence shame was not a 
significant predictor of support (β = .07, p > .45).
Support for material and financial compensation. The model 
containing the three predictors also explained a signifi-
cant proportion of the variance in support for material 
and financial compensation, R2 = .21, F(3,157) = 15.49, p < 
.001. Both essence shame (β = .24, p < .03) and guilt (β = 
.36, p < .001) were significant positive predictors of support 
for monetary and material compensation being offered to 
Kenyans. Image shame was not significantly associated with 
support for compensation, although the trend was in the 
predicted direction (β = -.11, p < .26).
4.4. Discussion
The present study provides preliminary evidence for the 
different predictive effects of essence and image shame. Es-
sence shame was associated with support for monetary and 
material compensation, whereas image shame was associ-
ated with support for apology.
85IJCV : Vol. 4 (1) 2010, pp. 75 – 88Allpress et al.: Atoning for Colonial Injustices
Although we predicted that essence shame would be 
positively associated with both apology and compensation 
support, we found that it was in fact only positively associ-
ated with support for compensation. While we believe that 
support for compensation more strongly represents a desire 
to restore intergroup equality, the observed lack of associa-
tion with support for apology warrants further investiga-
tion. The lack of association may stem from methodologi-
cal issues in the measurement of the two types of shame. 
Only two items were used for each shame scale. Thus, 
although the construction of the independent variables 
was supported by confirmatory factor analysis, it may be 
that more reliable measurement, in future research with 
more comprehensive sets of items, would yield more power 
to detect the hypothesized relationship. Alternatively, 
the finding may signal instability across contexts in the 
cultural significance of apologies and their perceived ap-
propriateness to restore the group’s positive distinctiveness, 
such that the utility of apology may be perceived differently 
in the Kenyan situation, relative to, for example, the case in 
Australia. It may be that respondents in Study 2 perceived 
verbal apology and concrete compensation as compet-
ing rather than complementary strategies, and that those 
participants with higher essence shame perceived words as 
relatively empty and endorsed action instead. The positive 
inter-correlation between support for apology and support 
for compensation is more consistent with the former argu-
ment, however.
We also predicted that image shame would be positively 
associated with support for apology but negatively associ-
ated with compensation support, reflecting a desire not 
to address the inequalities between British and Kenyans, 
but merely to enhance the international reputation of the 
ingroup. We observed partial support for this hypothesis, 
with image shame being positively associated with support 
for apology—a distinctly public act. Image shame was not 
significantly associated with compensation support, and 
the trend was for higher shame to be accompanied by lower 
values for concrete action. Again, on a methodological level, 
the negative relationship between image shame and com-
pensation support may reach significance using additional 
measures with greater face validity, more reliable scales, or a 
larger sample. Even at face value, however, the present data 
suggest that image shame may spur support for “quick fix” 
gestures, such as apologies, without generalizing to con-
crete, longer-term solutions.
5. General Discussion
The present research illustrates the importance of under-
standing the effects of group members’ emotional reactions 
of shame and guilt over colonial injustices. The findings 
contribute to a growing literature that demonstrates that 
people can experience emotions for wrongs committed 
by a group to which they belong—even before they were 
born and against people no longer alive—and that these 
emotions can have important effects on contemporary 
intergroup relations. Indeed, feelings of guilt and shame 
explained between 21 and 40 percent of the variance in our 
measures of support for intergroup restitution, across con-
texts and in relation to different forms of restitution—con-
siderable explanatory power, given the complex historical, 
political, and economic conditions influencing intergroup 
relations.
Both Study 1 (general population) and Study 2 (student 
population) provide evidence that group-based guilt is as-
sociated with positive attitudes toward apologizing to and 
compensating a victim outgroup. Study 1, however, demon-
strated that guilt may not be associated with actual behav-
iour directed at bringing about outcomes such as an apol-
ogy. This implies that although guilt may be an important 
factor in determining whether an individual holds positive 
attitudes toward reconciliatory acts, guilt feelings may have 
little effect upon behaviour (Iyer et al. 2007). Other emo-
tions, such as shame, may be particularly important in 
motivating individuals to act upon their attitudes. 
In Study 1, group-based shame was shown to be associated 
not only with attitudinal support for apology and compen-
sation, but also the politically active behaviour of petition 
signing in support of the upcoming apology. There is grow-
ing evidence, therefore, that shame can be associated with 
pro-social outcomes (see also Allpress and Brown forth-
coming; Gausel et al. 2009).
Study 2 demonstrated that different forms of shame may 
motivate different responses to intergroup wrong-doing. 
Image shame was positively associated with apology sup-
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port. Essence shame, on the other hand, was associated with 
support for financial and material compensation—a less 
public act than apology, and therefore potentially a stronger 
indicator of a desire to restore an equal intergroup relation-
ship. Although Study 2 provides preliminary evidence that 
essence and image shame are different constructs and that 
they may be associated with different outcomes, future 
research is needed to address the methodological limita-
tions concerning the image and essence shame scales, and 
broaden the scope of the dependent measures. A greater 
range of anti-social measures such as avoidance, victim-
blaming, and a desire to cover up ingroup misdeeds, as well 
as additional pro-social measures, such as desire for contact 
and behavioural measures of pro-sociality, would allow a 
stronger test of the differential effects of image and essence 
shame.
6. Implications for Post-Colonial Reconciliation and Nation-Building
Previous papers on group-based guilt and shame have often 
concluded that guilt is a productive emotion in the promo-
tion of post-conflict restitution and reconciliation, whereas 
shame is likely to hinder such processes (e.g., Branscombe 
et al. 2004; Lickel et al. 2004). The evidence from the pres-
ent studies allows us to add an important qualification to 
these conclusions. Our research implies that guilt is indeed 
useful in promoting support for policies of restitution, but 
its effects do not always generalize to the level of actual 
behaviour (this finding is consistent with Iyer et al. 2007). 
If individuals are to act in support of the establishment of 
intergroup equality it is likely they need to be experiencing 
some form of shame.
On an applied level, it appears that groups attempting to ad-
dress histories of colonial violence would face less internal 
resistance if group members were experiencing a degree of 
essence shame and guilt. It is unclear as to how malleable 
these emotions are. However, research suggests that guilt 
arises primarily when group members perceive the ingroup 
to be responsible for harming another group (e.g., Brans-
combe and Doosje 2004), and our theorizing on essence 
shame leads us to believe that essence shame arises when a 
person perceives the actions of the ingroup as being incon-
sistent with the idea that the ingroup is moral and just. It 
may therefore be helpful to provide information about how 
the actions of the ingroup have affected the victim group 
and simultaneously to highlight the importance of morality 
for the ingroup.
One implication of our theorizing on image shame is that 
for those experiencing this emotion, apologies may serve 
more a desire to improve their image in the eyes of others 
than a desire to right a past wrong or bring about a more 
equitable intergroup relationship. An apology motivated 
by image concerns may not necessarily lead to a meaning-
ful improvement in intergroup relations. If our theoretical 
model is supported, future research may find that image 
shame promotes avoidance and concealment of ingroup 
wrongdoing, as well as lower support for reparation unless 
third parties expect and demand such gestures. If the vic-
tim group becomes aware of a self-serving dynamic, shal-
low apologies may actually further damage the intergroup 
relationship. This speculation of course does not necessarily 
imply that apologies are always motivated by a desire to 
enhance the ingroup’s image. Indeed, the fact that guilt is 
reliably associated with support for apologies highlights 
that a number of other motivations are likely to underlie 
apologies, and is in keeping with the finding that apologies 
can be a crucial step toward more favourable intergroup 
relations (Nobles 2008).
To sum up, we believe the present research not only pro-
vides theoretical clarification regarding the differential 
effects of shame and guilt at the group level, but also con-
tributes to a growing awareness of the complex emotional 
experiences of group life. Investigation into specific emo-
tions allows more precise predictions of intergroup behav-
iour that are ot possible using more generalized measures of 
ingroup bias or prejudice. Although intergroup relations are 
characterized and influenced by complex political, histori-
cal, and econoic factors, recognition of the varied and pow-
erful emotional influences on group members’intergroup 
behaviour allows a more nuanced teatment of intergroup-
behaviour allows a more nuanced treatment of intergroup 
violence and conflict.
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